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1. Introduction
"Injuries, therefore, should be inflicted all at once, that their ill savour being less lasting may the less 
offend; whereas, benefits should be conferred little by little, that so they may be more fully relished." 
– Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince
Ceteris paribus, would one inflict bad things all at once or spread them out? And would one do the same 
or the opposite with positive events? Machiavelli urges us to bunch the bad and space the good. We 
address this question empirically by looking at non-linearity in the effects of positive and negative events 
on life satisfaction and mental health in a large panel of Australian individuals observed since 2002. 
In classic utility function terms, Machiavelli argues for an S-shaped utility function that is con-
cave in positive and convex in negative shocks, like the value function of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979).1 Then, the average absolute impact of negative shocks decreases in their size (or number), with 
the same holding for positive effects. Under classic economic assumptions, on the other hand, the utility 
function is concave everywhere, which means the average absolute impact of negative shocks increases 
in their size. 
Implicit in the arguments of both Machiavelli and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is the idea 
that individuals' reference positions adapt to shocks, so that one can speak of a cumulative effect of 
positive and negative events over a long period of time. This hedonic adaptation has a long tradition in 
psychology, dating back at least as far as Brickman's and Campbell's Hedonic Relativism and Planning 
the Good Society (Brickman and Campbell, 1971). There is now an established body of evidence on 
hedonic adaptation to various positive or negative life events, including changes in marital status (Lucas, 
2005; Lucas and Clark, 2006; Oswald and Gardner, 2006; Stutzer and Frey, 2006), disability (Menzel 
et al., 2002; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008), income (Di Tella et al., 2010; Kuhn et al., 2011), or unem-
ployment (Clark et al., 2008), as well as studies looking at anticipation and adaptation to life shocks in 
relative comparison (Clark et al., 2008; Frijters et al., 2011; Clark and Georgellis, 2013). The phenom-
enon of adaptation is also explicit in the idea of homeostasis and set point theory, and often thought to 
be responsible for the lack of a strong relation between GDP and life satisfaction in rich countries.2 In 
our empirical analyses, we must therefore pay attention to the phenomenon of adaptation in order to 
separate that issue from the issue of non-linearity that determines the optimal spacing of events. 
1 Apart from convexity in the negative and concavity in the positive realm, Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s value 
function displays another characteristic which is analysed only indirectly in this paper: a discontinuity in the de-
rivative around the reference point with losses weighing higher than gains. We will indeed find that phenomenon 
in our empirical analyses, but it is not the main focus of this paper. 
2 The notion that economic growth did not coincide with growth in wellbeing in developed countries over the last 
fifty years or so dates back to Easterlin (1974). 
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There is a large literature on how individuals' wellbeing and behaviour reacts to various positive 
or negative life shocks. Apart from the aforementioned studies, which have a particular focus on hedonic 
adaptation, the literature includes studies on, for example, shocks to income and wealth (Gardner and 
Oswald, 2007; Adda et al., 2009; Baird et al., 2013; Apouey and Clark, 2015; Schwandt, 2018), war 
time experiences (Johnston et al., 2016), crime victimisation (Johnston et al., 2017), own criminal be-
haviour (Corman et al., 2011), homelessness (Curtis et al., 2013), and various other life shocks (Linde-
boom et al., 2002). However, despite the large interest in this topic, the question of optimal bunching of 
events has never been posed, to our knowledge. This reflects, in part, the inherent difficulty in finding 
random variation in enough life events simultaneously to be certain about their cumulative effect. Re-
searchers, therefore, have typically restricted themselves to look at single events in isolation, such as 
unemployment or marital breakdown, or else have been interested in particular psychological mecha-
nisms that hold for many events, such as the phenomenon of adaptation and the relation between deci-
sions and feelings. Yet, for both individuals and policy-makers alike, the question of optimal bunching 
is quite relevant for choice behaviour: individuals can make 'clean breaks' (all events at once), 'bite the 
bullet' (all bad events at once), 'take it one at a time' (events one by one), and so on. It would help for 
individual and policy deliberations to know whether negative events should be bunched or spread out, 
ceteris paribus. 
States can shield their populations from the full consequences of particular events, like health 
and income shocks, and they can create special provisions for individuals hit by multiple events, like 
hardship payments. The optimality of doing so crucially depends on the shape of the utility function: if 
utility was convex in the negative realm and budgets were finite, it would be better not to cushion neg-
ative shocks but let them impact simultaneously as the marginal utility lowers with further bad shocks. 
Yet, welfare safety nets follow the rationale of classic economics, namely that utility is concave every-
where and marginal utility is highest at the lowest level of consumption rather than at the reference 
point. The rationale of poverty alleviation and welfare states is partly given by the notions of 'basic 
needs' and that individuals should be shielded from particularly harsh outcomes brought about by accu-
mulated bad shocks. 
We find in our empirical analyses that Machiavelli, and by implication Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), were wrong: accounting for selection, anticipation, and adaptation, and holding the number of 
negative life events constant over an individual's life, we find that wellbeing decreases when negative 
events occur all at once as opposed to being spread out. For positive events, the same holds, meaning 
that the optimal policy is to spread out both the good and the bad, in line with classic economic assump-
tions. The utility function appears to be concave everywhere, not S-shaped. 
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We use data on six positive and twelve negative life events in the Household, Income and La-
bour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel. HILDA has several advantages over comparable datasets: 
it uniquely tracks the 18 life shocks we use for the entire duration of the panel (2002-now), has a large 
numbers of individuals (about 20,000), consistently measures life satisfaction and mental health in every 
survey year, and records life events on a quarterly rather than annual basis. The panel dimension allows 
us to look at within-person variation in life events and wellbeing, reducing some of the bias resulting 
from self-selection into particular events. The availability of quarterly event information allows us to 
account for the adaptation profile on a quarterly basis. 
In our most simple specification, we pool all positive life events into a single count variable and 
all negative events into another, finding clear evidence of a non-linear effect on both life satisfaction 
and mental health in line with the notion of a concave utility function. In our extended specification, 
where each event has its own adaptation and anticipation profile, we use indices of negative and positive 
events, finding the same overall pattern. In sensitivity analyses, we show that the results remain quali-
tatively the same when looking only at a specific subset of the more exogenous (for example, the death 
of a close friend) and unanticipated events in our dataset. Further robustness checks, including tests for 
selective attrition, respondents' fidelity and engagement with the survey questions, alternative outcomes, 
and alternative estimation procedures, are all in line with the main findings. 
We then ask: how much does the non-linearity in negative life events matter for overall wellbe-
ing? We find that spreading losses evenly in a given period of time reduces the overall wellbeing loss 
from these events by about 10%, whereas spreading benefits evenly raises overall wellbeing gain by 
about 2%, yielding an overall net wellbeing gain of about 12% of the total effect of the life shocks 
relative to the status quo. This is not a huge effect in terms of levels, only worth around 0.01 points 
increase in life satisfaction each period. 
Our findings add to two streams of literature: first, there is an established stream of literature 
studying anticipation and adaptation regarding various life events, both positive and negative. Clark et 
al. (2008) use annual data on four negative (unemployment, divorce, widowhood, and lay-off) and two 
positive life events (marriage and childbirth) from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP), 
showing that respondents anticipate and later fully adapt to most life events when it comes to life satis-
faction. Frijters et al. (2011) extend this analysis by studying wellbeing dynamics around changes in 
employment status (being promoted and being laid off), changes in family life (births, deaths, and di-
vorce), and changes related to the physical person (victimisation and health) in the HILDA panel. The 
authors confirm that respondents adapt to most changes in life circumstances. 
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A second stream of literature looks at the concavity of utility, with many studies focusing on the 
non-linearity around the reference point. A general finding is that financial worsening looms larger than 
financial improvement of the same absolute size, in line with concave utility functions that have a kink 
at the reference point and the prescript of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Using nationally representa-
tive longitudinal household data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the SOEP panel, 
Boyce et al. (2013) find that, over a relatively long time horizon, positive changes in income from one 
year to another yield a lower absolute change in life satisfaction than negative changes. A similar asym-
metry is found by De Neve et al. (2018) at the macro level when it comes to positive and negative 
fluctuations in economic growth. Likewise, Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) provide evidence of an S-
shaped utility function in the context of relative income, showing that positive deviations of own income 
from average income yield a lower absolute change in life satisfaction than negative deviations. We join 
both streams of literatures, allowing for a non-linearity at the reference point but focussing mainly on 
non-linearities further away from it. Importantly, we account for the dynamics of events by explicitly 
modelling anticipation and adaptation regarding each life event. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the data we use 
and provides summary statistics on the life events we study. Section 3 introduces the empirical strategy, 
including different types of estimation and different ways to operationalise the occurrence of life events 
in a given period of time. Section 4 presents our main findings and scrutinises their robustness regarding 
alternative operationalisations and explanations. Section 5 calculates counterfactuals. Finally, Section 6 
concludes and discusses implications for individual and policy choices. 
2. Data
We use nationally representative longitudinal household data from the HILDA panel for the period 2002 
to 2017. HILDA was first conducted in 2001 on a representative sample of 7,682 Australian households 
and 19,914 individuals. Since then, every year, interviews have been conducted with all members of a 
household who are at least fifteen years old at the time of the interview.3 Information is collected on a 
wide range of topics including educational attainment, health status, labour force dynamics, and income. 
The survey also asks household members about their overall life satisfaction, and importantly, whether 
major life events occurred during the last year, identifying the timing of each event on a quarterly basis 
relative to the interview date. 
Our primary outcome is life satisfaction, a cognitive, evaluative measure of subjective wellbe-
ing, which is obtained from a single-item eleven-point Likert scale question asking respondents: "All 
3 Unfortunately, we cannot use data from 2001 since life events have only been sampled from 2002 onwards. 
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things considered, how satisfied are you with your life?" Answer possibilities range from zero ("com-
pletely dissatisfied") to ten ("completely satisfied"). In our analyses, the largest sample with a complete 
set of information on both life satisfaction and life events includes 176,280 person-year observations. In 
this sample, mean life satisfaction is about 8.0, with a standard deviation of about 1.4, suggesting, in 
line with panel data evidence from other countries, that Australian respondents are, on average, rather 
satisfied with their lives. Life satisfaction is sometimes referred to experienced utility (Kahneman et al., 
1997; Dolan and Kahneman, 2008), and seen as a proxy for utility for a wide range of choice behaviours 
(Benjamin et al., 2012). By and large, in experimental settings, people have been shown to make choices 
that are consistent with maximising their subjective wellbeing (Adler et al., 2017). 
As an alternative outcome, we use mental health from the SF36 health survey. The SF36 is a 
multi-purpose questionnaire on health-related quality of life and co-administered with the HILDA panel 
(Ware et al., 1995). Following Mervin and Frijters (2014), we construct a mental health summary score 
from fourteen items of the SF36 item battery covering four health domains: (i) mental health in general 
(i.e. being a happy person, being a nervous person, being calm and peaceful, feeling down, and feeling 
down in the dumps); (ii) role-emotional functioning (i.e. changes in the amount of time spent at work as 
a result of emotional problems); (iii) social functioning (i.e. emotional problems interfering with social 
activities); and (iv) vitality (i.e. feeling tired, feeling worn out, feeling full of life, and having a lot of 
energy). The resulting summary score ranges from zero to 400, with higher values implying better men-
tal health. We divide it by 40 so that it has the same scale as our measure for life satisfaction, and then 
take its natural log to reduce its skewedness. 
Our variables of interest are major life events, both positive and negative. These are obtained 
from a battery of binary items asking respondents about whether a specific life event occurred during 
the past twelve months. If respondents report to have experienced a specific event, they are asked 
whether it occurred up to three months ago, three to six months ago, six to nine months ago, or nine to 
twelve months ago. To avoid small cell sizes, we recode these events on a biannual basis. 
We exploit information about the timing of the event to account for anticipation and adaptation, 
which have been shown to be important features surrounding major life events (see Clark et al. (2008), 
Frijters et al. (2011), or Clark and Georgellis (2013), for example). To account for anticipation, we create 
dummy variables for periods preceding the interview in which the event was reported (i.e. leads), in-
cluding dummies for, respectively, up to six months ago, six to twelve months ago, twelve to eighteen 
months ago, and eighteen to 24 months ago. Similarly, to account for adaptation, we create dummy 
variables for periods succeeding the interview in which the event was reported (i.e. lags), including 
dummies for, respectively, the next six months, the next six to twelve months, the next twelve to eighteen 
months, the next eighteen to 24 months, and more than 24 months. We assume that respondents cannot 
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anticipate life events further than two years into the future, and that any adaptation is complete within 
two years after the interview so that the dummy for an event which occurred more than 24 months ago 
picks up the long-run effect of that event. 
We are initially agnostic about which life events to include and exploit all eighteen major life 
events available in the HILDA panel. These can be broadly categorised into six positive and twelve 
negative life events. 
Positive life events are: 
1. Birth or adoption of a new child




6. Got back together with spouse
Negative life events are: 
1. Death of a close friend
2. Death of an extended family member or relative
3. Death of a spouse or a child
4. Major worsening of finances (e.g. went bankrupt)
5. Made redundant
6. Serious illness or injury to a family member
7. Serious personal illness or injury
8. Family member detained in jail
9. Detained in jail (self)
10. Victim of property crime (e.g. theft, breaking and entering)
11. Victim of physical violence (e.g. assault)
12. Separated or divorced from spouse
Table 1 shows summary statistics on these life events, split by positive and negative events, including 
the number of occurrences of each event. It also reports, conditional on experiencing a specific event, 
how many positive or negative events there are recorded for that person, at which age of respondents 
the events occur, and which household income and educational attainment respondents report to have, 
on average, when reporting the events. 
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Table 1 Column 1 shows that the positive life event reported most often is being promoted, followed by 
the birth or adoption of a new child; the least frequently reported is getting back together with a spouse 
after prior separation. The negative life event that is reported most often is serious illness or injury of a 
family member, followed by the death of an extended family member or a relative; the least frequently 
reported is being detained in jail. 
Column 2 yields the mean number of positive or negative life events, respectively, conditional 
on having experienced a specific event. For example, respondents reporting to have experienced a pro-
motion report, on average, about 4.1 positive events (including the promotion itself), respondents re-
porting to have experienced serious illness or injury of a family member about 9.6 negative events (in-
cluding the serious illness or injury itself). Thus, respondents reporting to have experienced a positive 
life event report, on average, between 3.6 and 4.1 positive events, while respondents reporting to have 
experienced a negative life event report between 8.4 and 11.1 negative events. 
There are some average age differences between people experiencing positive or negative events 
(Column 3), with birth and jail happening to younger individuals, and retirement and the death of a 
spouse to older individuals. Those experiencing positive events have slightly more educational attain-
ment (Column 4) and higher household income (Column 5). To net out such differences in observables 
between people experiencing positive and negative events, we routinely control for age, education, and 
income throughout our regressions. Table A1 in the Appendix shows, in addition, the distribution of life 
events, split by positive and negative events, over the past twelve months as counts of person-year ob-
servations. Here, we observe, for example, that 421 individuals experience five negative life events in 
the same year, but less than 200 three or more positive events, which implies that the statistical power 
to identify non-linearities in the positive realm will be weaker than the power to identify non-linearities 
in the negative realm. 
3. Empirical Strategy
We estimate all models on both life satisfaction and mental health, both taken as measures of wellbeing. 
We start with the following parsimonious model, which is linear in form, treats life events as continuous, 
and initially does not account for dynamics around life events (i.e. anticipation and adaptation): 
Yit = β0 + γ0#Pos + γ1#Pos² + γ2#Neg + γ3#Neg² + β1Xit’ + ui + εit (1) 
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where Yit is either the life satisfaction or mental health of individual i in year t; #Pos is the number of 
positive and #Neg the number of negative life events in the last year (where we suppressed the subscripts 
i and t); Xit is a vector of controls, including age, age squared (divided by 100), years of education, and 
log household income. ui is an individual fixed effect to net out time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
at the individual level, acknowledging that individuals differ substantially in their ability to anticipate 
and adapt to changing life circumstances (Lucas, 2007; Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016; Etilé et 
al., 2019). Individual fixed effects also ensure that variation comes from within individuals, reducing 
some of the bias from self-selection into particular events. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level. 
Our coefficients of interest are γ0, γ1, γ2, and γ3. Machiavelli's proposition – neglecting dynamics 
around life events for the time being – would lead one to expect that γ0 > 0 and γ1 < 0 (i.e. the relationship 
between positive life events and wellbeing is concave) and γ2 < 0 and γ3 > 0 (i.e. the relationship between 
negative life events and wellbeing is convex), implying that losses loom larger than gains and that there 
is no tipping point when it comes to losses. 
An alternative, more flexible way to specify Equation (1) is to use binary instead of continuous 
measures of life events. This is shown in the following model: 
Yit = β0 + γ0Pos3+ + γ1Pos2 + γ2Pos1 + γ3Neg1 + γ4Neg2 + γ5Neg3 + γ6Neg4 + 
+ γ7Neg5 + γ8Neg6+ + β1Xit’ + ui + εit (2) 
where Pos# and Neg# are dummy variables (where we again suppressed the subscripts i and t) equal to 
one if a respondent experienced, respectively, # positive or # negative life events in the previous year, 
the remainder being the same as before. In this case, Machiavelli's proposition would lead one to expect 
that (i) coefficients for positive events have positive signs and coefficients for negative events have 
negative signs, and (ii) there is a concave relationship between wellbeing and positive events as well as 
a convex relationship between wellbeing and negative events. 
These initial models do not take into account anticipation and adaptation regarding life events, 
implicitly assuming that no life events are anticipated and full adaptation occurs after exactly 12 months. 
To account for anticipation and adaptation, we extend our parsimonious model to become: 




it) + β1Xit’ + ui + εit (3a) 
9 
where Wposit and W
neg
it are positive and negative events indices that themselves include both anticipation 
and adaptation elements, such that the main question reduces to whether g() is concave in both Wposit 
and Wnegit. These negative and positive events indices are constructed as follows: 
Wposit = ∑j∈Jpos∑szji,t+syj,t+s (3b.1) 
Wnegit = ∑j∈Jneg∑szji,t+syj,t+s (3b.2) 
Here, Jpos and Jneg are the sets of positive and negative events; zji,t+s is the positive or negative life event 
j experienced by individual i in biannual period t+s, with s ∈ S = {less than -24 months,-24 to -18 
months, -18 to -12 months, -12 to -6 months, 0 to 6 months, 6 to 12 months, 12 to 18 months, and 18 to 
24 months}. For each positive or negative event, we therefore estimate eight parameters. 







it) to estimate the parameters y, which allows for the construction of the 
indices Wposit and W
neg
it in Equations (3b.1) and (3b.2). In a second step, we estimate Equation (3a) using 
the imputed values of Wposit and W
neg
it, allowing us to study the effects of the non-linearities versus the 
initial specification without them. In an alternative specification, we estimate Equation (3a) in one go, 
which requires a non-linear regression as g(.) can be various non-linear parametrisations of the positive 
and negative events indices.4 We should mention that estimating Equation (3a) in two steps or in one go 
makes little difference to our results: the main finding is somewhat stronger if it is estimated in one go 
(see the discussion of Table 6), but the two-step procedure is easier to interpret. 
The positive and negative events indices explicitly take into account anticipation and adaptation 
regarding life events by aggregating events weighted by their coefficient estimates, that is, by their rel-
ative contributions to the wellbeing dynamics around the respective events. Note that the positive events 
index has a positive and the negative events index a negative sign. Our indices implicitly take into ac-
count that positive and negative events may not be symmetric and may differ from each other in terms 
of nature and magnitude of impact. 
As to the choice of g(.) in the second step of our two-step estimation, we are initially agnostic 
and assume two different parametrisations: first, we assume a simple quadratic polynomial whereby the 
question of concavity is determined by the sign of the quadratic terms: 
4 See Appendix Tables A2a and A2b for the parameters of the positive and negative index numbers estimated via 
Equation (3). Since these are in line with estimates from previous studies, we do not discuss them in more detail. 
The most important thing to note is that positive events have cumulative positive and negative events cumulative 
negative effects. 
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it² + β1Xit’ + ui + εit (3c.1) 
Second, we use a weighting on the positive and negative realms depending on these indices: 










it / (1 + θ3|W
neg
it|) + β1Xit’ + ui + εit (3c.2) 
Here, the positive and negative events indices Wposit and W
neg
it enter the model in a non-linear manner: 
θ0 and θ2 capture the main impacts of life events, whereas θ1 and θ3 capture accelerating or decelerating 
impacts. As these models must be estimated using non-linear least squares, and non-linear least squares 
estimation cannot readily be applied to the individual fixed effect ui, we transform the non-linear model 
by subtracting the first observation, i.e. we estimate the transformed model Yit
* = Yit - Yi0. 
We are initially agnostic whether Equation (3c.1) or (3c.2) fits the data best, and therefore let 
our model choice be guided by goodness-of-fit. In Equation (3c.1), Machiavelli's proposition boils down 
to the same condition as in Equation (1): it is true if θ0 > 0 and θ1 < 0 (i.e. the relationship between 
positive life events and wellbeing is concave) and θ2 > 0 and θ3 > 0 (i.e. the relationship between nega-
tive life events and wellbeing is convex), implying that losses loom larger than gains in absolute terms 
and that there is no tipping point for losses. Note that we expect θ2 > 0 (rather than θ2 < 0) since the 
negative events index is, by definition, negative, so that θ2 yields the strength of the correlation between 
negative life events and life satisfaction. In contrast, in Equation (3c.2), concavity in both realms boils 
down to θ0 > 0, θ1 > 0, θ2 < 0, and θ3 < 0. 
4. Results
4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 2 shows our baseline results. We first look at Column 1, which correspondents to the linear model 
of Equation (1) which lacks anticipation and adaptation effects. Recall that all specifications control for 
demographics, including age, education, and income, as well as individual fixed effects. 
Column 1 shows that the number of positive life events experienced during the past twelve months has 
a significant positive effect on life satisfaction, whereas the number of negative events has a significant 
negative effect, both at the 1% significance level. Unlike for positive events, the quadratic for negative 
events also has a significant negative effect at the 1% level, which is, however, smaller in size; the 
quadratic for positive events fails to meet a conventional significance level. From this parsimonious 
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model, it seems that there is a linear relationship between positive life events and wellbeing, but a con-
cave one for negative life events, whereby wellbeing is decreasing at an increasing rate in the number 
of negative events. This rejects Machiavelli's proposition, and is more in line with a tipping point inter-
pretation for negative events: inflicting all injuries at once would bring about greater wellbeing loss than 
inflicting the same amount of injuries little by little during a given period of time. 
Column 2 corresponds to Equation (2) and uses binary measures corresponding to how many 
positive or negative events were experienced during the past twelve months. This binary parametrisation 
is more flexible, yet a similar picture arises as for the continuous parametrisation: there seems to be a 
linear (or slightly concave) relationship between positive life events and wellbeing, with wellbeing in-
creasing linearly (or at a slightly decreasing rate) in the number of positive events (significance levels 
tend to decrease in the number of positive events). The picture for negative life events is less clear but 
also suggestive of a concave as opposed to convex relationship, pointing again towards a tipping point 
interpretation for negative events. Figure A1 in the Appendix plots coefficient estimates obtained when 
estimating Equation (2). 
Column 3 corresponds to the two-step linear model in Equation (3c.1), with positive and nega-
tive life events entering the model as indices in both levels and quadratics. Accounting for anticipation 
and adaptation within these indices, a similar picture arises as before: the index for positive life events 
has a strong, significant positive effect on life satisfaction at the 1% level, whereas the quadratic effect 
of the positive life events has the expected sign (negative). However, its t-value of 1.6 fails to meet the 
conventional levels of statistical significance. The index for negative life events and its quadratic are, 
on the contrary, both significant at the 1% level. Note that the index for negative events is, by definition, 
negative itself, so that a positive sign for the coefficient estimate shows the strength of the correlation 
between negative life events and life satisfaction only. The negative on the quadratic, which is itself 
always positive, implies a concave relationship. 
Overall, these results are in line with the previous, showing a linear (or slightly concave) rela-
tionship between positive life events and life satisfaction and a concave relationship for negative events. 
This is in line with a tipping point interpretation for negative events: inflicting all injuries at once would 
bring about greater damage than inflicting them little by little during a given period of time. Figure 1 
plots coefficient estimates obtained when estimating Equation (3c.1): there is concavity between gains 
and wellbeing as well as concavity between losses and wellbeing, unlike the S-shaped value function by 
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Note that we are agnostic about whether there exists a kink at the refer-
ence point, since our measure of life events is not on a single continuous dimension that would allow to 
cardinally compare the positive with the negative.5 
We ran joint hypotheses tests to check more formally whether we can reject linearity in the 
effects of positive and negative life events on life satisfaction. For positive events, we cannot reject the 
null that the coefficient for the positive events index in levels equals one and the quadratic equals zero: 
F(2, 18,709) = 1.26; Prob > F = 0.2848. For negative events, however, we can reject the null that the 
coefficient for the negative events index in levels equals one and the quadratic equals zero: F(2, 18,709) 
= 6.27; Prob > F = 0.0019. The hypotheses tests again confirm linearity in the positive and concavity in 
the negative realm, as shown previously. 











it / (1 + θ3|W
neg
it|)), whereby γ0 and γ2 capture the 
main impacts of events and γ1 and γ3 accelerating or decelerating impacts. 
Column 4 is in line with the previous results: positive events (θ0) have a positive effect on life 
satisfaction which is significant at the 1% level, whereby the dampening effect (θ1) also has a strong 
positive coefficient. However, it fails to reach statistical significance at a conventional level (t=1.7). 
This suggests a linear (or slightly concave) relationship between positive life events and life satisfaction. 
In contrast, both θ2 and θ3 have significant negative coefficients, in line with a concave relationship. 
Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the predicted relation between the events indices and life satisfaction 
estimated from Equation (3c.2). 
We again ran joint hypotheses tests to check more formally for linearity in the relationships 
between life satisfaction and positive or negative life events. In case of our non-linear model, we con-
ducted likelihood-ratio tests. For positive events, we reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients for 
the positive events index (first term) and for its absolute value (second term) equals zero: LR χ²(2) = 
26.87; Prob > χ² = 0.0000. Likewise, for negative events, we reject the null: LR χ²(2) = 118.18; Prob > 
χ² = 0.0000. Once again, this is in line with concavity in both positive and negative realms. 
5 If one looks at the two life events that potentially allow one to construct a cardinal, one-dimensional interpretation 
(that is, predicted income changes when respondents report positive or negative financial shocks), the resulting 
non-linearity around the reference point is indeed roughly a factor of 2 (Frijters et al., 2011), in accordance with 
the kink predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
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4.2. Heterogeneous Effects 
Do these findings hold for different types of people? To find out, we run a heterogeneity analysis on our 
preferred model according to goodness-of-fit, Equation (3c.1). Table 3 shows the results when splitting 
the estimation sample by gender, education, age, and personality traits of respondents.6 
Our baseline result – a concave relationship between life satisfaction and life events – holds across the 
board. There are, however, slight differences in curvature between different types of people. Table 3 
Columns 1 and 2 show that men benefit, relative to women, more strongly from positive life events 
when it comes to life satisfaction, but also show stronger diminishing returns. Moreover, men experience 
a less strong initial decrease in life satisfaction following negative life events, but at the same time, 
experience a stronger depreciation as more and more negative events occur in a given period of time. 
This may relate to differences in risk preferences between gender (as evidenced by Borghans et al. 
(2009), Sapienza et al. (2009), or Charness and Gneezy (2012), amongst others). This relationship is not 
straightforward, though: it seems there is more to win for men with positive life events but also more to 
lose if multiple negative events occur, which has ambiguous implications regarding what would be an 
optimal choice. One could similarly say that women are more sensitive to small negative but more robust 
when it comes to larger negative shocks compared to men. 
While people with low education (defined as having no high school degree) have a similar pro-
file when it comes to positive life events as people with higher education, they show a larger decrease 
in life satisfaction following a negative life event, thus being more sensitivity to negative events. How-
ever, people with higher education report a steeper decline once more and more negative events occur 
in a given period of time. Age differences are minor, with the exception that people above 40 years of 
age show a significant quadratic on positive life events, providing evidence for diminishing returns.  
Following Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee (2016) and Etilé et al. (2019), we also test for differ-
ences between people with different personality traits (using the extroversion dimension of the Big-5 
personality inventory): compared to extroverted people, introverted people exhibit stronger diminishing 
returns to positive life events while, at the same time, a steeper decline once more and more negative 
events occur. In principle, these results could be used for targeting groups who experience stronger 
concavity and have more to gain from optimal spacing of a given number of events. 
6 Table A3 in the Appendix replicates this exercise for Table 2 Column 4, that is, the non-linear model accounting 
for anticipation and adaptation, which is our second-best model according to goodness-of-fit. 
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4.3. Robustness to Variable Selection and Sampling Issues 
We next run a series of robustness checks using our baseline specification in Equation (3c.1). Results 
are presented in Table 4; Figure 2 plots coefficient estimates from these robustness checks. We discuss 
them in turn.7 
4.3.1. Exogenous and Unanticipated Life Events 
One obvious worry is the potential endogeneity of life events, which could, for instance, bias our results 
if it was true that most of the occasions in which a person experienced a single positive or negative event 
were the result of conscious choices and thus already anticipated long ago, but where this would not be 
true for individuals hit by many shocks. We would then underestimate the importance of single shocks 
versus multiple shocks. 
To investigate this, in Column 1 of Table 4, we focus only on the (arguably) more exogenous 
positive and negative events (for example, the death of others) which individuals are less likely to have 
anticipated or initiated.8 In Column 2, we focus only on those events that have been shown empirically 
in our regressions to involve insignificant levels of anticipation.9 
The signs, sizes, and significance levels of the coefficients in Column 1 closely mimic those of 
our baseline specification, showing that picking the life events that intuitively seem more exogenous 
makes little difference. Almost the same is true when restricting the sample to respondents experiencing 
events for which we do not find significant anticipation effects (Column 2). One exception is that the 
quadratic for the positive events index turns significant, showing more clearly a concave relationship 
between positive life events and life satisfaction. Overall, however, restricting the sample to respondents 
experiencing more exogenous events strengthens the initial conclusions. 
7 Corresponding results for Equation (3c.2) can be found in Table A4 in the Appendix. See Figure A3 for the 
plotted coefficients of these robustness checks. 
8 More exogenous positive life events are major improvements in finance (e.g. won lottery), more exogenous neg-
ative ones death of a close friend, death of an extended family member or relative, death of a spouse or a child, 
major worsening of finances (e.g. went bankrupt), made redundant, serious illness or injury to a family member, 
serious personal illness or injury, family member detained in jail, detained in jail (self), victim of property crime 
(e.g. theft, breaking and entering), and victim of physical violence (e.g. assault). 
9 Positive life events without significant anticipation are major improvements in finance (e.g. won lottery), retired, 
and got back together with spouse. Negative life events are death of a close friend, death of an extended family 
member of relative, made redundant, family member detained in jail, detained in jail (self), victim of property 
crime (e.g. theft, entering and breaking), and victim of physical violence (e.g. assault). 
15 
4.3.2. Selective Attrition 
Another worry is selective attrition: respondents who are most positively affected by positive life events 
(for example, winning the lottery) may be more likely to drop out of the sample. By the same token, 
respondents who are most negatively affected by negative life events (for example, the death of others) 
may be more likely to drop out. In both cases, systematic out-of-sample-selection biases our results 
downwards, potentially with knock-on effects for our non-linearities. To investigate this, in Column 3, 
we show the results when restricting our estimation sample to respondents who are present during the 
entire observation period. 
As expected, we find that, when excluding drop-outs ex-ante, coefficient estimates are slightly 
smaller in size in the positive realm than those in our baseline specification; in the negative, they are 
only negligibly different. This suggests that selective attrition has little impact on our findings. 
4.3.3. Meta-Survey Measures of Respondent's Engagement with Questions 
Yet another worry is the fidelity of respondents when answering questions about their life satisfaction, 
and retrospectively, about experiences of positive or negative life events during the past twelve months. 
Such non-fidelity in answering behaviour could bias our results in both directions. 
To study the extent to which fidelity matters to our findings, we exploit two items that are rou-
tinely answered by interviewers after the interview of individual respondents. The first asks interview-
ers: "In general, how would you describe the respondent's co-operation during the interview?" The sec-
ond asks: "In general, how would you describe the respondent's understanding of the questions?" For 
both meta-survey measures, answer possibilities range from one ("excellent") to five ("very poor"). We 
dichotomise both items such that one equals categories two and above (i.e. "good" and above), and zero 
equals categories three and less (i.e. "fair" and below). We then supplement our baseline specification 
with both items as additional controls. Table 4 Column 4 shows the result of this exercise. 
There is little evidence that non-fidelity affects our findings: signs, sizes, and significance levels 
of coefficient estimates mimic closely those in our baseline specification. 
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We next look at mental health from the SF36 health survey as our alternative outcome. Figure 3 plots 
the coefficient estimates for mental health from our baseline specification in Equation (3c.1). For bench-
marking, it also plots the coefficient estimates for life satisfaction as our primary outcome.10 Recall that 
we have log-transformed mental health to reduce its skewedness.11 
While mental health shows a negligible influence arising from positive events (this impact, however, 
becomes more pronounced in the non-linear specification), the impact of negative events mimics that of 
life satisfaction. In fact, the curvature for mental health is even steeper, suggesting that mental health 
depreciates faster than life satisfaction as more and more negative life events occur: life satisfaction 
reaches a tipping point after about two events; mental health, on the contrary, reaches this point after 
only one event. Thereafter, mental health depreciates disproportionally. Qualitatively, mental health and 
life satisfaction are, therefore, similarly affected by negative events. 
4.5. Estimation Procedure: Two-Step Versus One-Go 
It is important to note that the two-step procedure for estimating Equation (3c.1) essentially imposes 
first-step estimates on elements of g(.) in the second step. This can lead to bias if the first-step estimates 
are themselves picking up non-linearities via sample correlations between the underlying non-linearities 
and particular shocks. We therefore check next whether the results remain the same when estimating 
both the indices and the non-linearities in one go. 
Table 6 shows the results of this exercise, with Column 1 presenting the results of the two-step 
procedure for estimating Equation (3c.1) and Column 2 the corresponding results when estimating the 
same equation in one go. The reason why the linear terms for the negative and positive events have no 
standard errors is because there is perfect collinearity between the coefficients of the events indices and 
the coefficients of the events in these indices in the one-go procedure. We therefore set the linear terms 
to coincide with their counterparts in the two-step procedure. 
10 Figure A4 in the Appendix replicates this figure for the non-linear model in Equation (3c.2): the plot is qualita-
tively similar. Table 5 Column 2 shows the corresponding coefficient estimates: in contrast to the quadratic model, 
these fail to reach statistical significance in the positive realm at a conventional level. Because of its better good-
ness-of fit, we take the quadratic model in Equation (3c.1) as our baseline specification. 
11 Figure A5 in the Appendix presents results where mental health has not been log-transformed (Table A5 presents 
corresponding coefficient estimates): here, mental health decreases linearly in the number of negative life events 
(rather than depreciating disproportionally, yet still contrary to Machiavelli's prescript). This is not that surprising 
due to the high skewedness of the non-log-transformed mental health data, which in the regressions places more 
weight on the right-hand tail rather than variation closer to the mean. 
4.4. Alternative Outcome: Mental Health 
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Importantly, the baseline results strengthen when using the two-step procedure in the sense that 
the coefficient estimate of the quadratic of the positive events index becomes even more negative and 
now statistically significant (-0.588 versus -0.415). Likewise, the coefficient estimate of the quadratic 
of the negative events index become more negative and significant (-1.644 versus -0.201). 
The R² requires careful interpretation as the underlying models do not naturally yield compara-
ble estimates of explained variance. This is due to the fact that the implicit individual fixed effects in 
the two-step model differ from those in the one-step model. We therefore have to define the relevant 
baseline variation against which the explained variation of the two model can be judged. We chose 
within-person variation, that is, the total variation is the sum of the squares of individual outcomes less 
their first observed outcome. Using this as our baseline variation, we find that the one-step model fits 
slightly better than the two-step model (0.0752 versus 0.0711). 
5. Counterfactuals
How relevant are these non-linearities? To gauge the potential for gains from optimal spacing, we look 
at hypothetical policies in which the negative and positive events are spaced out in time and over people 
rather than how they are distributed in the actual data. We make no comment on whether such a policy 
is feasible or how it could be implemented, but only look at the potential gain, ceteris paribus, of spread-
ing negative and positive events. 
To calculate potential gains from hypotheticals, we first need estimates for how much wellbeing 
is changed in the actual data by positive events and negative events, on average per year. This is rela-
tively easy, as it is the predicted average value of the positive and negative indices. For these estimates, 
we use Table 2 Column 3. 
The status quo currently yields the following wellbeing gain for positive events: 
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The equivalent wellbeing loss for negative events is given by: 
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As there are twelve negative and six positive events in the data, it is not entirely surprising that the total 
positive effects are about half those of the total negative effects. These somewhat low average effects 
reflect the fact that many individuals report no life events in a particular year, and that many events have 
somewhat small impacts. 
If we first think about the gain that individuals could get if the events they experienced in the 
actual data were evenly spaced, we can calculate total effects as: 
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑔(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑛























∑ 𝑔(𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑛





















Here, we are looking at the gain for individuals of spreading the events they experienced in the sample 
completely evenly. The results imply that the gain to an individual from spreading his or her positive 
events over time is about 2% compared to the status quo, whereas the gain from spreading his or her 
negative events over time is about 2.5%. In points of life satisfaction, the gains from spreading are small, 
only +0.0012 for spreading the positive events and +0.0024 for spreading the negative events. 
Importantly, these counterfactuals do not assume that individuals will have fully adapted to all 
life events by the end of the observation period: what is spread is the index of effects from life events, 
which includes both anticipation and adaptation effects. Hence, individuals are not 'done' anticipating 
the next events at the end of the period, nor are they 'done' adapting to events at that point. In the hypo-
thetical, we are only spreading all effects associated with positive and negative events evenly over the 
observation period. In reality, such a thing would only be practically possible if one would be able to 
have fractional negative events, which in many cases is impossible, for example when it comes to death. 
We are thus establishing an upper bound of the benefits of spreading events, noting that it is not a trivial 
mathematical exercise to determine the best spread over time of a finite set of actual events.12 
12 To see the difficulties of thinking about the spread of dichotomous events over time, consider that one would 
effectively assume one can do away with all anticipation effects by having all negative events happen at time zero. 
Also, the anticipation benefit of all positive events together with adaptation benefits are optimised by having a 
positive event happen in the middle of a bounded time period. Such implications are not in the spirit of the idea of 
optimal spreading by either individuals or policy-makers and would require fairly ad-hoc additional conditions to 
avoid. Simply spreading the index respects both anticipation and adaptation effects and hence concentrates the 
discussion on the benefits of optimising the non-linearity of effects. 
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We next consider the potential benefits of not only spreading events over time, but also spread-
ing events over individuals. We find that spreading positive events evenly over time and over individuals 
yields the following wellbeing gain, which is slightly larger (about 3%) than under the status quo: 
1
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Equivalently, spreading negative events evenly over time and over individuals yields the following well-
being gain, which is lower (about 5%) than under the status quo: 
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An optimal, net-wellbeing-maximising policy, which is one that inflicts all injuries and confers all ben-
efits little by little (as opposed to all at once) and which is spread evenly over time and over individuals, 
yields a wellbeing gain of +0.0108 for positive events and +0.0051 for negative events. Taken together, 
this is about 12% of the absolute effect of life events. 
7. Conclusion
We set out by asking whether it makes a difference for net wellbeing if a given number of losses and 
gains are inflicted all at once or little by little during a given period of time. Machiavelli, in his treatise 
on political philosophy, argued that losses should be inflicted all at once, whereas benefits should be 
conferred little by little. The same logic follows from the S-shaped value function by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). On the contrary, the classic economic assumption of a concave utility function leads to 
a different conclusion: it is better not to bunch negative events. 
We tested Machiavelli's prescript empirically and found that life satisfaction and mental health 
are concave in both negative and positive life events, strongly supporting the standard model which uses 
a concave utility function. The non-linearity is particularly strong for more than two negative events, 
with five negative events in the same year rated as just as bad as eleven events each experienced in 
different years. This finding continues to hold after allowing for selection, anticipation, and adaptation, 
as well as for event-specific effects. Moreover, we arrive at the same result when using only events that 
individuals themselves say were unanticipated, or when using the most exogenous events in our sample 
– the best we can do to overcome potential endogeneity. Finally, our finding also holds when including
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meta-measures of how seriously respondents have answered the questions, addressing the possibility 
that the result may be based on frivolous respondents. 
Whilst important for individuals who experience many positive and negative life events, we find 
that the benefits of spreading events over time are modest on average, simply because in empirical reality 
negative and positive events are already quite spaced in time. Thus, spreading all events evenly across 
all time periods and across all individuals increases the positive effects by 20% and decreases the nega-
tive effects by 5% – a modest improvement compared to preventing negative events altogether. Indeed, 
average improvements in life satisfaction of such an extreme spacing over time and over individuals are 
only about +0.016 per individual on a zero-to-ten scale. 
There are two main research and policy take-aways: first, the classic economic assumption of a 
concave utility function is borne out by data on both life satisfaction and mental health, in line with the 
focus of welfare states on the groups at the bottom of the wellbeing distribution. Second, while there is 
clear evidence for non-linearities in the negative and positive life events we looked at, these are of 
second-order consideration relative to their sheer occurrence, unless one is specifically interested in the 
very left or right tail of the wellbeing distribution. For these extremes, however, one wants to know 
more about implications of having many negative and positive life events, such as the costs imposed on 
others and the possibility that adaptation becomes slower if one has experienced many negative shocks 
in quick succession. These considerations are part of future inquiries. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Baseline Results – Linear Model, Anticipation/Adaptation, Index 
Notes: Figure plots life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when estimating Equation (3c.1) 
(Table 2 Column 3). Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. See Section 2 for a description 
of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 



























Number of Positive and Negative Life Events 
Experienced During Past 12 Months
Figure 2: Robustness Checks – Linear Model, Anticipation/Adaptation, Index 
Notes: Figure plots life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when estimating Equation (3c.1) 
(Table 2 Column 3 for baseline; Table 4 Column 1 for exogenous, Colum 2 for no anticipation, and 
Column 3 for interviewer observation). Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. See Section 
2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events 
indices. 



























Positive and Negative Life Events Indices
Baseline Exogenous No Anticipation Interviewer Observation
Figure 3: Alternative Outcome: Log Mental Health – Linear Model, Anticipation/Adaptation, Index 
Notes: Figure plots mental health relative to life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when 
estimating Equation (3c.1) (see Table 2 Column 3 for results on life satisfaction and Table 5 Column 1 
for results on mental health). Mental Health is measured using fourteen items of the Short-Form (SF36) 
Health Survey, transformed to a zero-to-ten scale, and logged. Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-
to-ten scale. See Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive 
and negative life events indices. 













































Positive and Negative Life Events Indices
Life Satisfaction Log Mental Health
Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Life Event 
Means Conditional on Occurrence of Life Event 
Life Events Number of Occurrences Life Events Age Years of Education Log Household Income 
Panel A: Positive Life Events 
Birth or Adoption of a New Child 6,736 4.038 31.728 13.050 11.171 
Major Improvements in Finance 5,536 3.620 44.920 12.790 11.046 
Got Married 4,339 3.802 35.313 12.881 11.257 
Got Promoted 11,448 4.102 33.778 13.224 11.448 
Retired 4,040 2.945 60.820 11.661 10.341 
Got Back Together with Spouse 1,781 3.665 34.997 12.196 10.715 
Panel B: Negative Life Events 
Death of a Close Friend 18,566 9.849 52.412 11.79 10.467 
Death of an Extended Family Member or a Relative 19,730 8.57 44.223 12.172 10.877 
Death of a Spouse or a Child 1,171 10.003 54.836 11.397 9.855 
Major Worsening in Finances 5,083 11.133 43.475 12.384 10.603 
Made Redundant 5,091 8.819 37.795 12.356 11.038 
Serious Illness or Injury of a Family Member 27,333 9.557 45.7 12.363 10.837 
Serious Personal Illness or Injury  14,620 9.969 49.324 12.123 10.557 
Family Member Detained in Jail 2,332 10.246 39.133 11.587 10.524 
Detained in Jail 333 10.387 33.174 11.088 10.06 
Victim of Property Crime 7,359 9 38.92 12.544 10.906 
Victim of Physical Violence  2,496 11.047 32.834 11.875 10.485 
Separated from Spouse 6,363 8.413 35.239 12.152 10.603 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
Table 2: Baseline Results 
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (0/10) 
Linear Model Anticipation/Adaptation 
No Anticipation/Adaptation Linear Model Non-Linear Model 
Continuous Measures Binary Measures Index Index 
Variables of Interest (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Positive Life Events 0.074*** 
(0.017) 
Number of Positive Life Events Squared 0.017 
(0.012) 
Number of Negative Life Events -0.070*** 
(0.007) 
Number of Negative Life Events Squared -0.015*** 
(0.003) 
Experienced 3 or More Positive Life Events 0.281* 
(0.113) 
Experienced 2 Positive Life Events 0.212*** 
(0.022) 
Experienced 1 Positive Life Event 0.093*** 
(0.008) 
Experienced 1 Negative Life Event -0.083*** 
(0.006) 
Experienced 2 Negative Life Events -0.194*** 
(0.010) 
Experienced 3 Negative Life Events -0.367*** 
(0.021) 
Experienced 4 Negative Life Events -0.449*** 
(0.046) 
Experienced 5 Negative Life Events -0.900*** 
(0.095) 
Experienced 6 or More Negative Life Events -1.187*** 
(0.177) 
Positive Life Events Index 1.141*** 
(0.085) 
Positive Life Events Index Squared -0.415 
(0.259) 
Negative Life Events Index 0.816*** 
(0.058) 
Negative Life Events Index Squared -0.201*** 
(0.060) 
Positive Life Events Index 0.359*** 
(0.107) 
Positive Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Positive Life Events Index|) 1.071 
(0.627) 
Negative Life Events Index -0.234*** 
(0.063) 
Negative Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Negative Life Events Index|) -0.181*** 
(0.025) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.017 0.0172 0.0711 0.0305 
N 176,280 176,280 116,959 116,959 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
 
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations.
 
Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects – Linear Model, Index 
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (0/10)  












Variables of Interest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Positive Events Index 1.203*** 0.957*** 1.097*** 1.033*** 1.043*** 1.289*** 0.997*** 1.162*** 
(0.139) (0.077) (0.113) (0.064) (0.105) (0.118) (0.105) (0.100) 
Positive Events Index Squared -0.569 0.232 -0.225 -0.274 -0.051 -0.812*** 0.106 -0.471* 
(0.382) (0.230) (0.296) (0.233) (0.268) (0.295) (0.344) (0.277) 
Negative Events Index 0.658*** 0.872*** 0.900*** 0.709*** 0.804*** 0.808*** 0.853*** 0.766*** 
(0.074) (0.077) (0.065) (0.078) (0.074) (0.071) (0.070) (0.097) 
Negative Events Index Squared -0.366*** -0.147* -0.117* -0.321*** -0.228*** -0.197*** -0.168** -0.230** 
(0.078) (0.080) (0.066) (0.074) (0.080) (0.067) (0.073) (0.100) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0763 0.0641 0.0528 0.0659 0.0753 0.0576 0.0613 0.0663 
N 55,036 61,923 79,919 37,040 63,287 53,672 62,318 45,359 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
Table 4: Robustness Checks – Linear Model, Index 
















Variables of Interest (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Positive Events Index 1.118*** 1.279*** 0.985*** 1.121*** 
(0.169) (0.133) (0.085) (0.085) 
Positive Events Index Squared -0.546 -1.252** 0.101 -0.400 
(0.634) (0.499) (0.348) (0.258) 
Negative Events Index 0.766*** 0.857*** 0.809*** 0.812*** 
(0.065) (0.104) (0.075) (0.056) 
Negative Events Index Squared -0.255*** -0.219*** -0.232*** -0.196*** 
(0.070) (0.063) (0.088) (0.057) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0619 0.0104 0.0627 0.0734 
N 116,959 116,959 41,074 116,931 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
Table 5: Alternative Outcome: Log Mental Health 
Dependent Variable: Log Mental Health 
Anticipation/Adaptation 
Linear Model Non-Linear Model 
Index Index 
Variables of Interest (1) (2) 
Positive Life Events Index 1.085*** 
(0.120) 
Positive Life Events Index Squared -3.920 
(2.451) 
Negative Life Events Index 0.834*** 
(0.054) 
Negative Life Events Index Squared -0.562*** 
(0.206) 
Positive Life Events Index 0.191 
(0.540) 
Positive Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Positive Life Events Index|) 15.071 
(38.584) 
Negative Life Events Index -0.188*** 
(0.069) 
Negative Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Negative Life Events Index|) -0.501*** 
(0.169) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0888 0.0569 
N 115,618 115,618 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Mental Health is measured using fourteen items of the Short-Form (SF36) Health Survey, transformed to a zero-to-ten scale, and logged. Controls include 
age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create 
positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
 
Table 6: Estimation Procedure: Two-Step Versus One-Go 
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (0/10) 
Anticipation/Adaptation 
Two-Step One-Step 
Linear Model Linear Model 
Index Index 
Variables of Interest (1) (2) 
Positive Life Events Index 1.141*** 1.141*** 
(0.085) N/A 
Positive Life Events Index Squared -0.415 -0.588*** 
(0.259) N/A 
Negative Life Events Index 0.816*** 0.816*** 
(0.058) N/A 
Negative Life Events Index Squared -0.201*** -1.644*** 
(0.060) N/A 
Controls Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0711 0.0752 
N 116,959 116,959 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
Appendix 
Figures 
Figure A1: Baseline Results – Linear Model, No Anticipation/Adaptation, Binary Measures 
Notes: Figure plots life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when estimating Equation (3b) 
(Table 2 Column 2). Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. See Section 2 for a description 
of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 




























Number of Positive and Negative Life Events
Experienced During Past 12 Months
Figure A2: Baseline Results – Non-Linear Model, Anticipation/Adaptation, Index 
Notes: Figure plots life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when estimating Equation (3c.2) 
(Table 2 Column 4). Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. See Section 2 for a description 
of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 





























Positive and Negative Life Events Indices
Figure A3: Robustness Checks – Non-Linear Model, Anticipation/Adaptation, Index 
Notes: Figure plots life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when estimating Equation (3c.2) 
(see Table 2 Column 4 for baseline; Table A4 Column 1 for exogenous, Column 2 for no anticipation, 
and Column 3 for interviewer observations). Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative 
life events indices. 






























Positive and Negative Life Events Indices
Baseline Exogenous No Anticipation Interviewer Observation
Figure A4: Alternative Outcome: Log Mental Health – Non-Linear Model, Anticipation/Adaptation, 
Index 
Notes: Figure plots mental health relative to life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when 
estimating Equation (3c.2) (see Table 2 Column 4 for results on life satisfaction and Table 5 Column 2 
for results on mental health). Mental Health is measured using fourteen items of the Short-Form (SF36) 
Health Survey, transformed to a zero-to-ten scale, and logged. Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-
to-ten scale. See Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive 
and negative life events indices. 












































Positive and Negative Life Events Indices
Life Satisfaction Log Mental Health
Figure A5: Alternative Outcome: Mental Health (0/10) – Linear and Non-Linear Model, Anticipa-
tion/Adaptation, Index 
Notes: Figure plots mental health relative to life satisfaction predicted from estimates obtained when 
estimating Equation (3c.1) (see Table 2 Column 3 for results on life satisfaction and Table 5 Column 1 
for results on mental health). Mental Health is measured using fourteen items of the Short-Form (SF36) 
Health Survey, transformed to a zero-to-ten scale. Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. 
See Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative 
life events indices. 
































Positive and Negative Life Events Indices
Life Satisfaction Mental Health (Linear Model) Mental Health (Non-Linear Model)
 
Table A1: Distribution of Life Events in Last 12 Months 
Number of Events Experienced in Last 12 Months Counts of Person-Year Observations 
Experienced 3 or More Positive Events 178 
Experienced 2 Positive Events 2,760 
Experienced 1 Positive Event 27,135 
Experienced 1 Negative Event 50,025 
Experienced 2 Negative Events 18,380 
Experienced 3 Negative Events 5,260 
Experienced 4 Negative Events 1,335 
Experienced 5 Negative Events 421 
Experienced 6 or More Negative Events 178 
178,965 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations.
Table A2a: Anticipation and Adaptation to Positive Life Events 
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (0/10) 
Birth or Adop-
tion of a New 
Child 
Major Improve-
ments in Finance 
Got Promoted Got Married Retired Got Back To-
gether with 
Spouse 
Variables of Interest (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
< -24 Months -0.060*** 0.059*** 0.076** 0.013 0.091*** 0.034 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.011) (0.023) (0.041) 
-24 to -18 Months -0.05 0.123*** 0.090* -0.012 0.142*** 0.123 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.035) (0.020) (0.037) (0.090) 
-18 to -12 Months -0.025 0.067* 0.106** 0.021 0.149*** 0.029 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.039) (0.018) (0.044) (0.069) 
-12 to -6 Months 0.091*** 0.145*** 0.156*** 0.001 0.083* 0.206** 
(0.027) (0.031) (0.035) (0.022) (0.040) (0.077) 
-6 to 0 Months 0.141*** 0.187*** 0.224*** 0.063*** 0.07 0.038 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.018) (0.043) (0.066) 
0 to 6 Months 0.124*** -0.049 0.141*** 0.008 -0.044 0.022 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.042) (0.019) (0.042) (0.070) 
6 to 12 Months 0.156*** -0.031 0.212*** 0.008 0.045 -0.019 
(0.026) (0.033) (0.036) (0.023) (0.039) (0.097) 
12 to 18 Months 0.061* -0.016 0.102* 0.054** 0.004 -0.091 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.045) (0.020) (0.039) (0.076) 
18 to 24 Months 0.04 -0.032 0.119** -0.031 0.017 0.049 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.037) (0.024) (0.040) (0.094) 
Controls Yes 




Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations.
Table A2b: Anticipation and Adaptation to Negative Life Events 
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (0/10) 
Death of a Close 
Friend 
Death of an Extended Family 
Member or Relative 
Death of a 
Spouse or a 
Child 
Major Worsen-
ing of Finances 
Made Redun-
dant 
Serious Illness or Injury 
to a Family Member 
Panel A: Negative Life Events 1 to 6 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
< -24 Months -0.01 0.006 -0.097* -0.059** 0.009 0.004 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.048) (0.021) (0.022) (0.008) 
-24 to -18 Months -0.016 0.009 -0.161* -0.190*** -0.057 -0.022 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.081) (0.044) (0.037) (0.015) 
-18 to -12 Months -0.004 -0.002 -0.144 -0.136** -0.003 0.008 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.080) (0.042) (0.034) (0.013) 
-12 to -6 Months -0.054** -0.018 -0.498*** -0.580*** -0.064 -0.028 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.110) (0.050) (0.040) (0.015) 
-6 to 0 Months -0.017 -0.011 -0.381*** -0.487*** -0.082* -0.030* 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.095) (0.044) (0.033) (0.013) 
0 to 6 Months 0.013 -0.021 -0.139 -0.125** 0.036 0.024 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.077) (0.047) (0.032) (0.013) 
6 to 12 Months 0.001 -0.01 -0.246* -0.235*** -0.056 -0.006 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.100) (0.049) (0.038) (0.016) 
12 to 18 Months 0.028 -0.001 -0.118 -0.105* 0.036 -0.009 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.078) (0.046) (0.034) (0.013) 
18 to 24 Months -0.017 -0.007 0.035 -0.149** -0.038 0.037* 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.098) (0.049) (0.040) (0.017) 
Serious Personal 
Illness or Injury 
Family Member Detained in 
Jail 




Separated or Divorced 
from Spouse 
Panel B: Negative Life Events 7 to 12 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
< -24 Months -0.059*** -0.03 -0.025 0.006 -0.087* 0.025 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.112) (0.018) (0.037) (0.023) 
-24 to -18 Months -0.102*** -0.027 -0.175 -0.042 -0.103 -0.142*** 
(0.023) (0.072) (0.293) (0.033) (0.073) (0.037) 
-18 to -12 Months -0.063** -0.037 0.071 0.006 -0.165** -0.087* 
(0.020) (0.050) (0.191) (0.026) (0.059) (0.040) 
-12 to -6 Months -0.236*** -0.062 -0.134 -0.084* -0.272*** -0.298*** 
(0.024) (0.066) (0.254) (0.033) (0.073) (0.038) 
-6 to 0 Months -0.192*** -0.075 -0.188 -0.065* -0.339*** -0.355*** 
(0.020) (0.050) (0.195) (0.026) (0.062) (0.044) 
0 to 6 Months -0.005 -0.028 -0.294 0.008 -0.233*** -0.041 
(0.020) (0.056) (0.205) (0.028) (0.070) (0.041) 
6 to 12 Months -0.074** 0.049 0.146 0.016 -0.105 -0.272*** 
(0.024) (0.069) (0.265) (0.037) (0.080) (0.040) 
12 to 18 Months 0.024 -0.088 0.059 -0.022 -0.02 -0.004 
(0.020) (0.058) (0.196) (0.029) (0.067) (0.044) 
18 to 24 Months -0.004 -0.049 0.295 0.034 -0.115 -0.056 
(0.023) (0.066) (0.175) (0.040) (0.093) (0.037) 
Controls Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes 
R-Squared 0.0726 
N 116,959 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations.
Table A3: Heterogeneous Effects – Non-Linear Model, Indices 
Dependent Variable: Life Satisfaction (0/10)  












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Positive Life Events Index 0.276 0.242 0.321 0.127 0.332 0.208 0.181 0.188 
(0.307) (0.248) (0.282) (0.236) (0.249) (0.233) (0.232) (0.276) 
Positive Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Positive Life Events Index|) 0.586 0.672 0.812 0.221 0.666 0.043 0.257 0.573 
(1.307) (1.180) (1.368) (0.859) (1.037) (0.613) (0.952) (1.146) 
Negative Life Events Index -0.259*** -0.144 -0.104 -0.302*** -0.218** -0.164** -0.221*** -0.241** 
(0.075) (0.095) (0.086) (0.092) (0.091) (0.084) (0.083) (0.114) 
Negative Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Negative Life Events Index|) -0.199*** -0.134*** -0.132*** -0.176*** -0.166*** -0.130*** -0.161*** -0.172*** 
(0.015) (0.044) (0.050) (0.020) (0.053) (0.013) (0.032) (0.056) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0381 0.0314 0.0303 0.0431 0.0383 0.0336 0.0339 0.0322 
N 55,036 61,923 79,919 37,040 63,287 53,672 62,318 45,359 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
 
Table A4: Robustness Checks – Non-Linear Model, Indices 
















Variables of Interest (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Positive Life Events Index -0.170 0.196 0.434 0.348*** 
(0.231) (0.365) (0.603) (0.138) 
Positive Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Positive Life Events Index|) -0.621 1.041 2.372 1.086 
(0.448) (2.378) (6.369) (1.416) 
Negative Life Events Index -0.260*** -0.480*** -0.152 -0.228*** 
(0.069) (0.134) (0.111) (0.062) 
Negative Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Negative Life Events Index|) -0.205*** -0.454*** -0.189*** -0.176*** 
(0.027) (0.003) (0.071) (0.027) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0204 0.0113 0.0414 0.0327 
N 116,959 116,959 41,074 116,931 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Life satisfaction is measured on a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See 
Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
Table A5: Alternative Outcome: Mental Health (0/10) 
Dependent Variable: Mental Health (0/10) 
Anticipation/Adaptation 
Linear Model Non-Linear Model 
Index Index 
Variables of Interest (1) (2) 
Positive Life Events Index 1.082*** 
(0.096) 
Positive Life Events Index Squared -0.524 
(0.392) 
Negative Life Events Index 1.032*** 
(0.042) 
Negative Life Events Index Squared 0.016 
(0.027) 
Positive Life Events Index 0.273 
(0.886) 
Positive Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Positive Life Events Index|) 4.869 
(18.758) 
Negative Life Events Index -0.024 
(0.067) 
Negative Life Events Index / (1 + Coefficient *|Negative Life Events Index|) -0.012 
(0.044) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.0943 0.0544 
N 115,626 115,626 
Robust standard errors clustered at individual level in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: Mental Health is measured using fourteen items of the Short-Form (SF36) Health Survey, transformed to a zero-to-ten scale. Controls include age, age 
squared divided by 100, years of education, and log household income. See Section 2 for a description of the data and Section 3 for the procedure to create positive 
and negative life events indices. 
Source: HILDA, 2002 to 2017, individuals aged 15 and above; own calculations. 
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